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Abstract
Whilst difficult to ascertain the full extent to which so called anti-forensic software applications are in use by the 
public, their threat to an investigation of digital content is tangible, where of particular interest is the use of file 
wiping tools, which remains the focus of this work. This work presents the examination of eight freely available 
wiping tools in order to identify the existence of ‘digital tool marks’ (DMTs) left on a system following their use. 
Further attempts are made to ascertain whether such DTMs can be attributable to a particular wiping tool. Analysis 
is focused on the impact each tool has on system at a file system level, where in this work both FAT32 and NTFS 
are the subject of investigation. DMTs relating to each wiping tool are provided and recoverable file system 
metadata post-wipe is described.    
Keywords: File Wiping; Digital Forensics; Deletion; Recovery; Digital Tool Marks; Forensics
1 Introduction
Software applications capable of wiping digital data from a device (termed ‘wiping tools (WTs)), placing content 
beyond current forensic powers of recovery are now available online for download and have been for some time. 
Many solutions offered are available free of charge and easily locatable via an online search engine query, making 
them an accessible option for those seeking to remove specific digital content from their system. For a WT to be 
effective it must completely overwrite a targeted set of digital data rendering this original content non-recoverable. 
Anecdotally, historic WTs are considered to have implemented a standard delete function as their primary way of 
removing data from a system, mistakenly under the guise of terminology which describes ‘wiping’. These 
processes may leave data retrievable using typical forensic file recovery methods. Arguably now, as a greater 
understanding exists regarding how file allocation and recovery is performed with such knowledge largely 
available online and to some degree publicised in the media, many WTs are likely to implement algorithms which 
effectively overwrite data. As a result, when a WT is now discovered as part of a digital forensic (DF) 
investigation, the chance of file content being recoverable providing a WT has been used effectively is diminished. 
The ‘effective use’ of a WT requires emphasis (as wiped data is generally considered not recoverable1 and implies 
that such applications can be used in a way which compromises their goal of data removal. Whilst possible, WTs 
may be pre-configured on install to perform their actions effectively meaning default settings may lead to a 
complete data removal. As such, these tools are accessible for those with limited computing knowledge where it 
is suggested they have been previously commonly used2. As a result, it is argued that the DF practitioner can no 
longer rely on the misuse of a WT in order to recover file content subject to such an application or expect to 
recover the original file content through carving processes. 
Given the aforementioned statements, it becomes easy to be of the mindset of ‘why bother’ in cases of suspected 
WT usage given that the data retrieval post-wipe is unlikely. Yet evidence of WT usage may in itself be an 
inference of a criminal act and in some circumstances be prohibited (for example, in cases where periodic 
computer checks are required under various supervision orders to enable an offenders usage history to be vetted). 
Although finding original (and potentially offending) file content following the attempted use of a WT may be 
considered the ‘holy grail’, any evidence denoting tool usage should also be considered an asset in terms of 
establish offender behavior and in some cases may be a primary source of evidence in its self. 
Despite being historic in reference, Kessler3 highlights that in relation to WTs, ‘most of the programs leave 
identifiable traces of the wiping’, a statement which is explored as part of this work. Evidence of usage left behind 
on a system can be classified as a ‘digital tool mark’ (DTM) drawing direct reference to the traditional forms of 
tool mark analysis carried out by traditional forensic science disciplines 4,5. DTMs which can be attributed to WT 
usage may support the identification of how a WT was used, when it was used and with what frequency. In 
addition, following the removal of a WT, any remaining DTMs may support a practitioner’s understanding of any 
resulting digital data and in some cases allow any digital trace evidence to be attributed to the use of a specific 
WT. All of these assertions require forensic exploration and remain an area under researched by the DF 
community. 
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This work forensically examines the impact of eight freely available WTs when used to wipe test file content on 
both FAT32 and NTFS file systems. File system metadata is discussed demonstrating the DTMs left by each tool 
following their use. This work opts to focus on file system metadata as it remains an under researched area in 
regards to WT DTMs where often, focus is given to operating system artefacts (for example, Prefetch, Link Files, 
Registry information). The impact of the chosen WTs on both file systems are documented in order to demonstrate 
any apparent DTMs attributable to each tool. Finally results are discussed and conclusions drawn.
2 Methodology
Generally WTs are placed under the umbrella term of anti-forensics (AF) and although some historic work 
considering and exploring the forensic examination of these tools exists (see  6,7,8), there are limited current works. 
This work explores WT usage at the file system level examining the impact of such tools on file system metadata. 
Figure 1 documents the methodology deployed within this work. All file system time analysis was carried out 
using ‘FTKi’ (v4.2.0.13) to query file system metadata and ‘NTFS $Logfile Parser’ (v2.0.0.46) to query NTFS 
$Logfile content. The same test data set (consisting of six standard files (four *.jpg and tw0*.pdf)) was utilised in 
all tests for consistency and to support the identification of any recoverable content following wiping actions.
Figure 1: An overview of the methodology deployed in this article.
This work examines the following eight wiping tools, brought to public attention by Digital Citizen9 in their 
article – ‘8 best free data erasing apps that permanently delete your files and folders’.
Table 1:- List of examined WTs and their download links.
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2.1 Configuration and Terminology
It is necessary to consider the ‘out of the box’ configuration of downloaded tools and where relevant, this work 
highlights the relevance of any preconfigured settings in operation for each of the eight chosen tools. Identifying 
default settings allow an evaluation of each tool’s potential DTMs to be assessed when an application is utilised 
by the hypothetical ‘lay-person’ who possesses limited technical knowledge. In addition, terminology bespoke to 
each tool will be highlighted where necessary. To provide an example, a comparison between CCleaner’s 
utilisation of well-known wiping algorithm terminology such as Gutmann against Freeraser’s use of the term ‘fast’ 
is drawn. Whilst without access to source code information, neither process can be 100% validated, the use of the 
term ‘fast’ to describe a tool’s chosen wiping algorithm is non-descript and in need of investigation. 
2.2 CCleaner (v5.51.6939)
CCleaner is a facility to ‘clean’ a computer system and whilst paid options are available, it can also be downloaded 
for free. The term clean encompasses a wide range of actions from redundant file removal to privacy enhancing 
features such as Internet browser history removal. CCleaner reports over 5 billion downloads worldwide and over 
35 million GB of data ‘cleaned every month10  and is one of the most popular tools of this type available online. 
The popularity and mainstream publicity of this tool increases the likelihood of its usage in device maintenance 
and therefore the potential of it impacting upon digital forensic investigations.
2.2.1 Setup
Analysis of CCleaner commences with its ‘out the box’ setup (its default configuration once installed). It is 
necessary to consider ‘out the box’ set up due to the potential diversity of users which inherently come with 
varying degrees of technical knowledge. This becomes important as CCleaner has the ability to remove digital 
data with varying levels of success, depending on its set up. Following testing, CCleaner is configured by default 
to carry out a ‘normal’ file deletion as opposed to ‘secure’ deletion. Testing confirmed that after a ‘normal’ file 
deletion, file content was still recoverable using forensic methods. A user must configure CCleaner to operate a 
secure wipe (with a default setting of one pass selected for this option, with three, seven and 35 passes available). 
Following testing, all secure options resulted in the non-recovery of test files. Whilst such configuration changes 
are minor, it does require an ‘opt-in’ from a user, where the act of doing so potentially infers an acknowledgement 
of understanding of this process. Further, the need to make this change means that potentially, those seeking an 
‘out the box’ solution for file wiping may mistakenly believe CCleaner achieves this by default and as a result, 
recoverability may be more likely.
2.2.2 CCleaner on FAT32
The first consideration of CCleaner usage is on the FAT32 file system (see 11 for an in depth discussion of FAT 
file system structures which are applicable to work covered in this article). Settings were configured to ensure 
secure wiping was enabled. Figure 2 demonstrates the file system metadata changes which occur following a 
CCleaner wipe of test file content.
Figure 2. A comparison of file system metadata for a FAT32 formatted device when CCleaner 1 pass wipe 
is enabled.
Following the use of CCleaner to wipe test target files on a FAT32 file system, the following key metadata changes 
occur:
File Name: Following tests, both the Long and Short filenames for the wiped file are consistently changed to ‘Z’ 
characters. The length of the filename remains the same (a ten character filename is replaced with 10 ‘Z’ 
characters). A file’s extension is also replaced with ‘Z’ characters. The presence of ‘Z’-ed file names is a consistent 
DTM of CCleaner use.
Time & Date: Whilst the modified time following wiping reflects the ‘time of wipe’, the created date for the file 
remains uncompromised and reflects the time and date when the file was created on the target media (all intricacies 
surrounding created date allocation still apply, i.e. copying of files to a new volume etc.). The accessed date is 
also updated to reflect the date of wipe.
Wiped Area: CCleaner’s wiping process wipes the entire physical disk space allocated to the file (both logical file 
size and slack space).
CCleaner’s securing wiping processes are effective in preventing recovery of any file content. 
2.2.3 CCleaner on NTFS
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The second consideration of CCleaner usage is on the NTFS file system (see 11 for an in depth discussion of NTFS 
file system structures). As with above, settings were configured to ensure secure file deletion occurs. Figure 3 
demonstrates the file system metadata changes which occur following a CCleaner wipe.
Figure 3: An example of file system metadata changes following a CCleaner wipe.
Following the use of CCleaner to wipe test target files on a NTFS file system, the following metadata changes 
occur:
File Name: Following tests, as with FAT32, the filename for the wiped file are consistently changed to ‘Z’ 
characters. The length of the filename remains the same (a ten character filename is replaced with 10 ‘Z’ 
characters). A file’s extension is also replaced with ‘Z’ characters. Following a wipe, the $MFT maintains no 
original file name information.
Time & Date: In comparison to FAT32, the NTFS file system maintains a more complex structure with multiple 
time and date recording attributes. As a starting point, the $MFT entry for the target file records the created and 
accessed timestamps for the target file post-wipe as unchanged. Modified and changed timestamps post-wipe 
reflect the time of wiping. INDX information is no longer available. 
Wiped Area: CCleaner’s wiping process wipes the entire physical disk space allocated to the file (both logical file 
size and slack space).
CCleaner’s secure wiping process is effective in preventing recovery of any file content. CCleaner wipes file 
content with hex characters ‘0x00’ on both FAT32 and NTFS and there is no option to amend this.
2.2.4 The $Logfile
One of the features of NTFS is its Log File Service (LFS) which provides potential recoverability in the case of a 
crash12. LFS information on an NTFS formatted disk is contained within the $Logfile. To understand the 
importance of the $Logfile in terms of establishing file system metadata, Microsoft13 provides the following 
overview.
“NTFS views each I/O operation that modifies a system file on the NTFS volume as a transaction, and 
manages each one as an integral unit. Once started, the transaction is either completed or, in the 
event of a disk failure, rolled back (such as when the NTFS volume is returned to the state it was in 
before the transaction was initiated).
To ensure that a transaction can be completed or rolled back, NTFS records the suboperations of a 
transaction in a log file before they are written to the disk. When a complete transaction is recorded 
in the log file, NTFS performs the suboperations of the transaction on the volume cache. After NTFS 
updates the cache, it commits the transaction by recording in the log file that the entire transaction is 
complete.
Once a transaction is committed, NTFS ensures that the entire transaction appears on the volume, 
even if the disk fails.” (Microsoft, 2008)
CCleaner does not wipe NTFS $Logfile content and as a result, the $Logfile captures file transactions on the file 
system including file interactions carried out by CCleaner (such as those noted in Figure 2). Whilst the $Logfile 
does not keep an indefinite record of transactions due to size limitations, a timely acquisition of this content can 
support the identification of file metadata pre-wipe as CCleaner does not wipe appropriate records from this 
transaction log. Using Joakim Schicht’s ‘NTFS $Logfile Parser’ tool (https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser) 
$Logfile content parsing is possible. Referring back to Figure 2, it can be seen that the test file 4n6_Content.docx 
has its metadata residing in $MFT record 41. Using NTFS Logfile Parser it is possible to establish ‘all the various 
filenames a given $MFT Record has had during the timespan that the $Logfile covered’14. Therefore an 
examination of MFT records which have been ‘Z’-ed can potentially reveal the original name assigned to the file 
before the wipe took place.
2.2.5 Usage Limitation for Forensic Exploitation
CCleaner has a number of preconfigured ‘cleaning facilities (browser targeted artefact removal, registry key 
removal), but of focus in this work is the ability for a user to customise the software to target user created content 
(for example, imagery in a user defined folder on a profile Desktop which a user wishes to remove from their 
system). This is achievable in CCleaner in 2 ways; a single file selector or directory/drive selector. If the user opts 
Page 4 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tajf
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
to select individual files, the file selector dialog box in CCleaner is subject to the same restrictions as Windows 
Explorer. If the user has opted not to show ‘protected operating system files’, then such content cannot be 
individually selected and wiped as CCleaner cannot see it. However, where a folder has been wiped, all content 
is captured within the wipe process. Both individual file, and folder select cannot wipe previously deleted content 
as technically it cannot path to it as deleted content is not viewable via CCleaner’s file/folder selector dialog box. 
Therefore where the user has interacted with file types (for example, the Microsoft Office Suite) which may 
generate temporary content which is then removed, such traces remain intact and may be of value when identifying 
what content was wiped (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: An example of temporary content remaining intact following an initiated wipe.
2.3 File Shredder (v2.5)
File Shredder offers a basic file and folder secure delete option with no comprehensive system cleaning features 
available like those seen with CCleaner. Unlike CCleaner, there is no option to standard delete, all options result 
in file content being placed beyond forensic powers of recovery. File Shredder by default offers a ‘Simple One 
Pass’ wipe and as a result this algorithm is the focus of this work. To commence, File Shredder usage on a FAT32 
system is considered.
2.3.1 File Shredder on FAT32
Figure 5 documents the result of targeted file wiping via File Shredder. When files are selected for wiping, the 
original file container is maintained and a secondary numerically named file is created. The numeric naming of 
the file appears random following testing. The original file container maintains the original file’s name and its 
created time stamp reflects the time and date when the file was created on the target media (all intricacies 
surrounding created date allocation still apply, i.e. copying of files etc.). The modified time stamp represents the 
time of wipe. 
Figure 5: Simple one pass wipe by File Shredder on FAT32
Regardless of which of the secure wipe algorithms chosen (five in total, ‘Simple one pass’, ‘Simple two pass’, 
‘DoD 5220-22.M’, ‘Secure erasing algorithm with 7 passes’ and ‘Gutman’), Figure 4 documents the consistent 
DTMs left by File Shredder, including a file’s extension being replaced with ‘Z’ characters. Following a file wipe, 
allocated file size if always zero. 
2.3.2 File Shredder on NTFS
On NTFS, File Shredder functions differently, where the original file’s container and metadata is gone (unlike on 
FAT32), replaced only by a numerically named wipe container as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Simple one pass wipe by File Shredder on NTFS
Each of the numeric wipe files contains date and time information where the created time stamp denotes the time 
and date of the file’s creation on the volume (all previously noted caveats appl ) and the modified time stamp 
denotes the time of wipe.
File Shredder, as with CCleaner, does not wipe $Logfile content. Therefore as a result, it is possible to identify 
specific name changes for an $MFT record entry assigned to each numerically named wipe file. Similarly with 
FAT32, on NTFS File Shredder leaves DTMs in the form of numerically named files with ‘Z’ character extensions 
of file size zero.   
2.4 Eraser (v 6.2.0.2982)
Eraser offers 13 wiping algorithms ranging from one pass to 35 (with known-named algorithms listed – i.e. US 
DoD 5220.22M). By default, Eraser is configured to deploy the Gutmann 35 pass wipe algorithm, which 
effectively removes file content following testing. 
2.4.1 Eraser on FAT32
Following testing, wiped files are assigned an alphanumeric file name, minus a file extension. All available file 
system time stamps are replaced with the value 01-01-1980 and are of file size zero (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Eraser use on FAT32
2.4.2 Eraser on NTFS
Similar to FAT32, wiped files on an NTFS file system are assigned an alphanumeric file name, minus a file 
extension. All available file system time stamps are replaced with the value 01-01-1601 except for the Date 
Changed (MFT) value which reports the time of wipe. $Logfile original file name information remains available 
as described in previous test cases.
2.5 Freeraser (v1.0.0.23)
Freeraser offers three modes of deletion, ‘fast’, ‘forced’ and ‘ultimate’, where all result in a successful file wipe. 
By default, ‘fast’ is selected, but no information is available as to what algorithm is utilised.
2.5.1 Freeraser on FAT32
Files wiped by Freeraser on FAT32 maintain their file name and size (see Figure 8). Whilst the modified time 
following wiping reflects the ‘time of wipe’, the created date for the file remains uncompromised and reflects the 
time and date when the file was created on the target media (all intricacies surrounding created date allocation 
still apply, i.e. copying of files etc.). The accessed date is also updated to reflect the date of wipe. File size metadata 
is still available
Figure 8: Freeraser on FAT32
2.5.2 Freeraser on NTFS
Files wiped by Freeraser on NTFS maintain their file name and size. Further, file system time stamp metadata 
remains available. File created time and date remain and reflected file created time and date, with the file modified 
timestamp reflecting the time of wipe. $Logfile metadata remains as a source of information as previously noted 
in past cases.
2.6 WipeFile (v2.4.1.0) 
WipeFile offers 14 wiping algorithms for the user to choose from. By default, a one pass wipe is selected.
2.6.1 WipeFile on FAT32 
Following a file wipe, created time and modified timestamps are replaced with 01/01/1980. File names are 
replaced with an alphanumeric string which in length and extension is equal to the length of original final name 
(see Figure 9).
Figure 9: WipeFile on FAT32
2.6.2 WipeFile (v2.4.1.0) on NTFS
Following a file wipe, the same file name issues exist as with FAT32 and all timestamps are set to 01/01/1980. 
$Logfile information remains in operation.
2.7 DPWipe (v1.1)
DPWipe offers six different wiping algorithms, where by default ‘US DoD 5220.22-M 3x’ is selected.
2.7.1 DPWipe on FAT32
Following a file wipe, three file containers are created as shown in Figure 10. All containers have identical file 
system metadata, where one file maintains the original file name, one has a file name of all ‘a’ characters and the 
final is a FAT short file named file with a randomised naming convention. The created time stamp remains intact 
with the modified timestamp reflecting the time of wipe. It remains difficult to establish a definitive DPWipe 
DTM with regards to the wiped file area are dependent upon the algorithm utilised.
Figure 10: DPWipe on FAT32
2.7.2 DPWipe on NTFS
A DPWipe on NTFS removes the files original name replacing it with a single ‘a’ character. File modified, 
accessed and created times are set to 01/01/1980. File size metadata is removed. Post wipe, MFT Filename 
timestamps remain where the ‘created time’ reflects the created time of the file on the volume and the ‘changed’ 
time reflects the time of wipe (see Figure 11). $Logfile information remains available.
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Figure 11: DPWipe on NTFS
2.8 Moo0 Shredder (v1.21) 
Moo0 Shredder offers 4 wipe types where by default it is set to ‘Shred Once (Normally Unrecoverable)’. There 
is no discussion of what each algorithm does as bespoke informal names have been assigned to each (Vaporize 
(vanish it!), Into Ashes (Extremely Secure), Extra Careful (Even More Secure) and Shred Once (Normally 
Unrecoverable)).  
2.8.1 Moo0 Shredder on FAT32
Following a wipe on FAT32, files names are replaced with an alphanumeric randomised string which is the same 
length in characters as the original file name. Randomly generated modified, accessed and created date and times 
are assigned to the wiped file (see Figure 12).
Figure 12: Moo0 Shredder on FAT32
2.8.2 Moo0 Shredder on NTFS
On NTFS, the same file naming principles apply post wipe as with FAT32. Randomly generated modified, 
accessed and created date and times are assigned to the wiped file. However, MFT Filename timestamps remain 
where the created time reflects the created time of the file on the volume and the ‘changed’ time reflects the time 
of wipe. $Logfile information remains available.  
2.9 BitKiller (v2.0) on FAT32
BitKiller offers five wiping algorithms, where by default, it is set to wipe with ‘Random data’.
2.9.1 BitKiller on FAT32
Following a wipe, BitKiller leaves both the original file metadata in place and creates a second file container of 
nine characters long (random character naming) which the same time stamp information. The created timestamp 
reflects the time and date the file was created on that volume and the modified time reflects the time of wipe (see 
Figure 13). 
Figure 13: BitKiller on FAT32
2.9.2 BitKiller on NTFS
Unlike with FAT32, on NTFS, post wipe, no file name information remains (except in the $Logfile). MFT 
Filename timestamps remain where the ‘created time’ reflects the created time of the file on the volume and the 
‘changed’ time reflects the time of wipe (see Figure 14).
Figure 14: BitKiller on NTFS
2.10 Wipe Summary
To provide a collated summary of the performance and available file system metadata post-wipe from all eight 
tools, Tables 2 and 3 offer a breakdown of actions on both FAT32 and NTFS. 
Table 2: Wipe summary on FAT32
Table 3: Wipe summary on NTFS
3 Conclusions
The volatility of digital data and ease of its destruction now mean that DF practitioners must be prepared to face 
more questions regarding why a system may be absent of a specific evidence type. Whilst it may not be possible 
to answer this question in some cases, the presences of DTMs may offer some insight into a user’s behaviour with 
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regards to their system. DTMs remain an under researched area in DF and as a result, the field maintains limited 
documented evidence of the remnants left behind on a device by WTs. Increasing a practitioner’s knowledge of 
DTMs in this area provides an opportunity to support the practitioner during an investigation to address the 
following points:-
1. To identify what tool has potentially been used to remove content from a system.
2. To understand what volume and type of evidence is likely to be left following an assumed tools’ usage.
3. To identify any potentially limits imposed on the investigation given the likelihood of a specific tool 
being used.
This work provides the DTMs associated with eight WTs when used on FAT32 and NTFS file systems. Results 
indicate that regardless of the wiping algorithm chosen by any of the eight tools, wiping of target test files was 
shown to be effective. In regards to FAT32, five tools left file system metadata capable of being used to establish 
the original created date and time of a wiped file and the ‘date and time of a file wipe event’. Seven tools 
demonstrated notable post-wipe DTMs which can be used to identify that wiping had taken place, possibly linking 
such behaviours to a specific tool. The original file name of a wiped file was retrievable following a file wipe 
from four tools.
On NTFS, seven tools left file system metadata capable of being used to establish the original created date of a 
wiped file, and six tools left information describing the ‘date and time of a file wipe event’. Seven tools 
demonstrated notable post-wipe DTMs which can be used to identify that wiping had taken place, possibly linking 
such behaviours to a specific tool. Seven tools demonstrated notable post-wipe DTMs which can be used to 
identify that wiping had taken place, possibly linking such behaviours to a specific tool. The original file name of 
a wiped file was retrievable following a file wipe from all tools following the use of the NTFS $Logfile (and in 
only one case without the need for the $Logfile). It should be noted that all algorithms available on each of the 
eight tools tested results in an effective file wipe. 
This work aims to provide a starting point for DTM research in DF where further sustained work is required in 
order to fully identify digital trace evidence which can be used to determine system events, even after typical 
evidential file content may have since been removed.
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Figures:-
Figure 1: An overview of the methodology deployed in this article.
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Figure 2. A comparison of file system metadata for a FAT32 formatted device when CCleaner 1 pass wipe 
is enabled.
Figure 3: An example of file system metadata changes following a CCleaner wipe.
Figure 4: An example of temporary content remaining intact following an initiated wipe.
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Figure 5: Simple one pass wipe by File Shredder on FAT32
Figure 6: Simple one pass wipe by File Shredder on NTFS
Figure 7: Eraser use on FAT32
Figure 8: Freeraser on FAT32
Figure 9: WipeFile on FAT32
Figure 10: DPWipe on FAT32
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Figure 11: DPWipe on NTFS
Figure 12: Moo0 Shredder on FAT32
Figure 13: BitKiller on FAT32
Figure 14: BitKiller on NTFS
---------------------------------------------------
Tables:-
Table 2: Wipe summary on FAT32
Tool File 
Recoverable*
Time of 
Wipe
Created 
Time
File Name DTMs
Table 1:- List of examined WTs and their download links.
Name Link
CCleaner (v5.51.6939) https://www.ccleaner.com/ 
File Shredder (v2.5) http://www.fileshredder.org/
Eraser (v6.2.0.2982) https://eraser.heidi.ie/download/
Freeraser (v1.0.0.23) https://freeraser.en.uptodown.com/windows/download
WipeFile (v2.4.1.0) https://www.gaijin.at/en/software/wipefile
DP Wipe (v1.1) https://www.softpedia.com/get/Security/Security-Related/DP-
WIPER.shtml
Moo0 Shredder (v1.21) https://www.softpedia.com/get/Security/Secure-cleaning/Moo0-
FileShredder.shtml
BitKiller (v2.0) https://sourceforge.net/projects/bitkiller/
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CCleaner (v5.51.6939) No Yes Yes No Wiped files have names 
comprising of ‘Z’ 
characters. Wiped space is 
hex character 0x00.
File Shredder (v2.5) No Yes Yes Yes Both an original file 
container and paired wipe 
container which has a file 
extension of three ‘Z’ 
characters. All files have 
allocated file size of zero.
Eraser (v6.2.0.2982) No No No No Alphanumeric file name, 
minus a file extension. All 
available file system time 
stamps are replaced with the 
value 01-01-1980 and are of 
file size zero.
Freeraser (v1.0.0.23) No Yes Yes Yes No unique traits.
WipeFile (v2.4.1.0) No No No No File names are replaced with 
an alphanumeric string 
which in length and 
extension is equal to the 
length of original final name. 
Created time and modified 
timestamps are replaced 
with 01/01/1980.
DP Wipe (v1.1) No Yes Yes Yes A file’s original name is 
replaced with a single ‘a’ 
character. File modified, 
accessed and created times 
are set to 01/01/1980. File 
size metadata is removed. 
Post wipe, MFT Filename 
timestamps remain where 
the created time reflects the 
created time of the file on the 
volume and the ‘changed’ 
time reflects the time of wipe
Moo0 Shredder (v1.21) No No No No Files names are replaced 
with an alphanumeric 
randomised string which is 
the same length in characters 
as the original file name. 
Randomly generated 
modified, accessed and 
created date and times.
BitKiller (v2.0) No Yes Yes Yes The original file metadata 
remains in place and a 
second file container of nine 
characters long (random 
character naming) which the 
same time stamp 
information is created.
Table 3: Wipe summary on NTFS
Tool File 
Recoverable*
Time of 
Wipe
Created 
Time
File Name DTMs
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CCleaner (v5.51.6939) No Yes Yes Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
Wiped files have names 
comprising of ‘Z’ 
characters. Wiped space is 
hex character 0x00.
File Shredder (v2.5) No Yes Yes Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
Wipe file containers are 
created with numeric file 
names seven characters in 
length with file extension of 
three ‘Z’ characters. All files 
have allocated file size of 
zero.
Eraser (v6.2.0.2982) No Yes No Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
Alphanumeric file name, 
minus a file extension. All 
available file system time 
stamps are replaced with the 
value 01-01-1601 except for 
the Date Changed (MFT).
Freeraser (v1.0.0.23) No Yes Yes Yes No unique traits.
WipeFile (v2.4.1.0) No No No Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
File modified, accessed and 
created times are set to 
01/01/1980. File size 
metadata is removed. Post 
wipe, MFT Filename 
timestamps remain where 
the created time reflects the 
created time of the file on the 
volume and the ‘changed’ 
time reflects the time of 
wipe.
DP Wipe (v1.1) No Yes Yes Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
The presence of three file 
containers which all have 
identical file system 
metadata, where one file 
maintains the original file 
name, one has a file name of 
all ‘a’ characters and the 
final is a FAT short file 
named file with a 
randomised naming 
convention.
.Moo0 Shredder (v1.21) No Yes Yes Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
Files names are replaced 
with an alphanumeric 
randomised string which is 
the same length in characters 
as the original file name. 
Randomly generated 
modified, accessed and 
created date and times. MFT 
Filename timestamps remain 
where the created time 
reflects the created time of 
the file on the volume and 
the ‘changed’ time reflects 
the time of wipe.
BitKiller (v2.0) No Yes Yes Yes 
($Logfile 
only)
The original file metadata 
remains in place and a 
second file container of nine 
characters long (random 
character naming) which the 
same time stamp 
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information is created. MFT 
Filename timestamps remain 
where the created time 
reflects the created time of 
the file on the volume and 
the ‘changed’ time reflects 
the time of wipe.
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